And Chief Justice John Roberts, another conservative on the bench, also had something of a mic-drop moment when Sauer tried to make the point that “we’re in a new world where eight billion people are one plane ride away from having a child who’s a U.S citizen.”

Roberts replied: “It’s a new world. It’s the same Constitution.”

So, Roberts probably isn’t going to make this argument, and I think that it is very unlikely that SCOTUS would rule that birthright citizenship isn’t a thing — there’s a lot of case law behind it being a thing — but there are a number of methods in constitutional law in which one can interpret the Constitution, and some of them do permit for an increased degree to which SCOTUS should try to actively adapt to changes in the world. You have textualism, originalism…let me go looking for a list, since I can’t rattle off all of them from memory.

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https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45129

When exercising its power to review the constitutionality of governmental action, the Supreme Court has relied on certain “methods” or “modes” of interpretation—that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of a provision within the Constitution. This report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation; discusses examples of Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate the application of these methods; and provides a general overview of the various arguments in support of, and in opposition to, the use of such methods of constitutional interpretation.

• Textualism. Textualism is a mode of interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear. Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text.
• Original Meaning. Whereas textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus solely on the text of the document, originalist approaches consider the meaning of the Constitution as understood by at least some segment of the populace at the time of the Founding. Originalists generally agree that the Constitution’s text had an “objectively identifiable” or public meaning at the time of the Founding that has not changed over time, and the task of judges and Justices (and other responsible interpreters) is to construct this original meaning.
• Judicial Precedent. The most commonly cited source of constitutional meaning is the Supreme Court’s prior decisions on questions of constitutional law. For most, if not all Justices, judicial precedent provides possible principles, rules, or standards to govern judicial decisions in future cases with arguably similar facts.
• Pragmatism. Pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable practical consequences of one interpretation of the Constitution against other interpretations. One flavor of pragmatism weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. Under another type of pragmatist approach, a court might consider the extent to which the judiciary could play a constructive role in deciding a question of constitutional law.
• Moral Reasoning. This approach argues that certain moral concepts or ideals underlie some terms in the text of the Constitution (e.g., “equal protection” or “due process of law”), and that these concepts should inform judges’ interpretations of the Constitution.
• National Identity (or “Ethos”). Judicial reasoning occasionally relies on the concept of a “national ethos,” which draws upon the distinct character and values of the American national identity and the nation’s institutions in order to elaborate on the Constitution’s meaning.
• Structuralism. Another mode of constitutional interpretation draws inferences from the design of the Constitution: the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers); the relationship between the federal and state governments (known as federalism); and the relationship between the government and the people.
• Historical Practices. Prior decisions of the political branches, particularly their long-established, historical practices, are an important source of constitutional meaning. Courts have viewed historical practices as a source of the Constitution’s meaning in cases involving questions about the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights, particularly when the text provides no clear answer.

Justices tend to be viewed as individually favoring some methods over others. There are justices that tend to favor greater use of pragmatism in interpreting the Constitution, and a pragmatist might be more willing to interpret law differently in light of changes in the surrounding environment. I’m pretty sure that Roberts isn’t considered to be a pragmatist, though. I don’t really like the portrayal in the media of some justices as “conservative” and others “liberal” — I think that that this is misleading and presents a view of their actions that is over-politicized relative to the reality — but it’s generally the ones that are called “liberal” that are pragmatists.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Roberts

During his confirmation hearings, Roberts said he did not have a comprehensive jurisprudential philosophy and did “not think beginning with an all-encompassing approach to constitutional interpretation is the best way to faithfully construe the document.”[91][92] Roberts compared judges to baseball umpires: “[I]t’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”

Yeah, that’s not a pragmatist approach.

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Breyer — now retired — was apparently considered to be more of a pragmatist.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Breyer

Breyer is known for his pragmatic approach to legal interpretation, which emphasizes practical consequences and the purpose of legislation. Cass Sunstein described this outlook as one that “will tend to make the law more sensible” and praised Breyer’s critiques of originalism as “powerful and convincing”.

And here’s an article by Breyer specifically stating that he tended towards using pragmatism:

https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-138/pragmatism-or-textualism/

Pragmatism or Textualism

I have not tried, in either Reading the Constitution or this Commentary, to describe advantages and disadvantages of different interpretive methods in theory: many scholars have already done so.30 Rather, I have tried to draw upon my own experience as a judge and a Justice, using illustrative examples (particularly those where traditionalists and textualists likely disagree). I hope that by doing so, and, in particular, by explaining why in a particular case I disagree with the textualist approach, I can explain why, in my view, textualism will not work. It cannot keep its promises. To the contrary, textualism threatens to make it far more difficult for law to work well for Americans and for the Constitution to keep its own promises of crafting a workable governmental system, protecting democracy, and safeguarding basic human rights.

I might add that Justice Scalia and I used to debate the virtues of these different approaches, typically before student audiences. The audience would come away believing we were good friends — which we were. They might also remember what I thought was at the heart of the debate. I would say law must adapt. After all, “George Washington did not know about the internet.” Justice Scalia would reply, “I knew that.” Then he would remind me of the two campers, one of whom sees the other putting on running shoes. “Where are you going?”, he asks. “A bear’s in the camp,” the other responds. “You can’t outrun a bear,” says the first person. “Yes,” says the second, “but I can outrun you.” So too, Justice Scalia would argue, textualism and originalism did not need to be perfect; they just needed to be superior to the alternatives. And my system, he would say, was so complicated that only I could use it. I would reply that his system risked producing a Constitution (and laws) that no one would want. Who was right? I hope that this Commentary, alongside my book, will help convince some that a more holistic approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation points the way to a better interpretive path.

But point is, the argument that the Executive was making there really relied on justices being willing to buy into more of a pragmatist interpretation of the Constitution, and I don’t think that that’s likely going to do terribly well with Roberts.