The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.
Devices running only local accounts are not affected.



The TPM architecture has always been fundamentally bad. More or less, these systems work by querying the TPM for the password and then pasting it into the password field. The way Linux does it is fundamentally flawed.
Edit: oh it’s just a window that lets you do stuff without logging in. I forgot Microsoft is that stupid now.
It does something very different than you’d naively expect, and is doing that just fine.
TPM just makes sure the code you run wasn’t manipulated/changed.
Or commonly on other device categories to make sure the code the manufacturer put there wasn’t changed by you to give you access.
In either case, if there are bugs you can exploit without changing code, then you get the same access as the operating system.
So if you are on a shitty OS like microslops windoes you should set a password query as early as possible, since that minimizes the chances. Ideally using a bios password or a wrapper decrypting the disk before the OS loads at all. Since microslop keeps adding both stupid bugs in early boot, and also actual (presumed) backdoors in e.g. the recovery.
Meanwhile on e.g. Linux, using TPM can essentially give you disk encryption protection but with the normal login screen and even multiple users.
That’s secure boot, not TPM.