Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

Xkcd 221: int getRandomNumber() { return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll. guaranteed to be random. }

  • x00z@lemmy.world
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    6 days ago

    That should be possible yes, depending on how those TVs handle their cert stores.

      • okr765@lemmy.okr765.com
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        6 days ago

        Most systems trust a number of “root” CAs, including the one that signed the eMudhra certificate. It’s possible LG TVs look specifically for a trusted LG certificate, but it’s also very possible they use the same certificate stores as most major OSes/browsers.

    • hirihit640@sh.itjust.works
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      6 days ago

      Thanks, I wasn’t sure if it mattered that the leaked keys in this case were for intermediate certs and not root certs (afaik)